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DICTA SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1960
ADVICE FOR ADVISORS - TRUST INVESTMENTS
By YALE HUFFMANf
This note was awarded the second prize of $100 in the 1960 writ-
ing competition sponsored by the Denver Clearing House Associa-
tion Trust Officers.
I. THE PROBLEM
Too often the corporate trustee is compelled to make an invest-
ment decision which his common sense opposes. Trust officers,
mindful of their liabilities should even the slightest risk materialize,
sometimes must take the sure-safe course against their inner judg-
ment. The "prudent man" rule, as it is stringently applied to trus-
tees, threatens to make timid souls of good red-blooded American
fiduciaries.
Two examples will illustrate the problem. In the first, a trust
estate includes common stock in a young growth company. Divi-
dends have produced a consistent 7% return. A good profit poten-
tial is enhanced by the prospect of a stock-split, likely in the offing.
Chances of a drop in the market appear remote; the trust officer's
personal hunch is that the odds are 50 to 1 that the stock will seek
a higher level. But he sells the attractive stock and re-invests the
proceeds at half the former return - to the distress of the bene-
ficiary.
A second example is offered by a trust estate which includes
a controlling block of shares in a close family corporation. Death
of the settlor has cast a tiny cloud over the future of the venture;
a cloud which would probably be dispelled were control to remain
in the trust estate. The widow beneficiary and her good friends in
the company importune the trustee to retain the shares - but he
disposes of them and buys ultra-conservative securities.'
Does the law require trustees to be so timorous? A first glance
at Colorado's statute2 dealing with the investment responsibilities
of trustees would appear to offer encouragement to the trustee who
would deal squarely with the risks involved in special situations.
Fiduciaries are expressly authorized:
to acquire and retain every kind of property - real, personal
and mixed - and every kind of investment, specifically includ-
ing, but not by way of limitation, . . .stocks, preferred or com-
mon . . . which men of prudence, discretion and intelligence
would acquire or retain on their own account.2
Commenting soon after the passage of this statute in 1951, Dean
Edward C. King said, "Properly understood, it will facilitate the in-
vestment of trust funds, will tend to produce a better income for
beneficiaries, and will permit wider diversification of investments.4
Are trustees, then, to be blamed for pusillanimity which trou-
Mr. Huffman is a senior student at the University of Denver College of Low.
1 Cola. Rev. Stat. § 83-1-1 (1953) gives statutory approval to certain archcons-rvtive securities
bringing law returns. It is mandatory for certain public funds, and sometimes has been used by
Private trustees as on investment guide.
2 Cola. Rev. Stat. § 57-3-1 to 6 (1953).
.3 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 57-3-1 (1953).
4 King, The Meaning of the "Prudent Man Rule," 24 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 44 (1951).
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bles their beneficiaries? Not if one reads the rules of prudence
which preface the statutory language quoted above. Trustees must:
. . . have in mind the size, nature and needs of the estates en-
trusted to their care, and shall exercise the judgment and care
under the circumstances then prevailing which men of pru-
dence, discretion and intelligence exercise in the management
of their own affairs, not in regard to speculation but in regard
to the permanent disposition of their funds. .... 5
A trustee must be doubly prudent. Not only must he adhere to
the standards prescribed; he must also consider the hindsight which
might occur some day in court. True, some court decisions disclaim
Fed. Reserve Reg. F, 12 C.F.R. § 206 (1959).
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any tendency to use hindsight, and the statute speaks of "circum-
stances then prevailing ' 6 - but a judge has wide fields of specula-
tion to range when he is deciding what a prudent, discreet, intelli-
gent man should have done months before. An investment which
looked good to the trustee last year may not look prudent to the
court today, or to the supreme court tomorrow. Poor widow plain-
tiffs have winning ways against banker-trustee defendants.
The trust officer of a national bank is mindful, too, of federal
regulations 7 making his board of directors responsible for invest-
ment decisions, as steered by the trust investment committee.
A corporate trustee which fails to sell stocks is likely to be held
to its "duty to exercise a proper degree of care and skill"8 - leading
in turn to questions of proper internal organization of the trust
company, or the proper functioning of its officers.9 A trust officer,
confronted with the prospect of judicial scrutiny of the inner work-
ings of his department, may well conclude that the "discretion"
vested in him is, as a practical matter, very narrow indeed.
Nor can he turn elsewhere for guidance. It is only the extra-
ordinary situation which will lead a court to make a trustee's deci-
sions for him."' He might consult with experts, but must not allow
their advice to govern him - as Mayor Curley discovered in Bos-
ton.11 Mayor Curley's problem arose from a trust created by Ben-
jamin Franklin, manifestly for the purpose of demonstrating the
validity of his maxim, "A penny saved is a penny earned." Franklin
settled on the people of Boston a thousand pounds sterling to be
placed at interest for a hundred years, forseeing a corpus of 139,000
pounds at the end of the century. At that point the trustees were
to spend 100,000 pounds and place the rest at interest for another
century - ad infinitum. It was this re-investment which the mayor
-trustee sought to delegate to the city treasurer. The court forbade
it: "The trustee cannot properly employ an agent to select invest-
ments."
Short of such reliance, and proper, is for the trustee to listen to
advice and reserve to himself the final decision.12 However, he has
little freedom to buy advice.13 Authority differs whether such an
expense is proper when not expressly authorized by the trust in-
strument. A trustee may encounter a variety of answers to the
question, "Is investment counsel expense proper?"
14
Summarizing the problem at hand, it seems accurate to say that
any departure by the trustee from the norms of orthodoxy in the
investment field may produce litigation which he has a strong
chance of losing -unless the terms of the instrument afford a way
out.
6 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 57.3-1 (1953).
7 Ibid.
8 77 A.L.R. 505 (1931).
9 2 Scott, Trusts f 174.1 (2nd ed. 1956).
10 Id. 1 259.
11 City of Boston v. Curley, 276 Mass. 549, 177 N.E. 557 (1931).
12 In re Dodge, 39 N.Y.$.2d 186 (1943).
13 2 Scott, Trusts 1 188.3 (2d ed. 1956).
14 The variety of answers encountered: In re Gutman, 14 N.Y.S. 2d 473 (1937) (no); In re




Trust draftsmen have contrived at least four escape-mecnan-
isms from some of the consequences described above. Three of them
are of limited efficiency: the co-trustee, the discretionary clause,
and 'che exculpatory clause.
The first of these, the co-trustee, is often one who has been
brought in because he is peculiarly equipped to make the invest-
ment decisions arising out of trusts. This does not solve the whole
problem, however, because his special qualifications do not free his
co-trustees from liability for improvident investments. One trustee.
may not delegate any discretionary duties to another trustee. "It is
improper for one of the trustees to leave to the others the control
over the administration of a trust," says Scott.15 Hence the corpo-
rate trustee gets little surcease from the presence of a co-trustee ad-
visor; he still must exercise his independent judgment in invest-
ment matters and may be liable for unintelligent decisions.
Nor does the advisor welcome a full co-trusteeship. The reason
for bringing him in may be solely for the purpose of reviewing in-
vestment decisions. To clothe him with the garb of trustee is to
burden him with duties and liabilities not commensurate with the
specific job intended for him.
The objections just stated are voiced on behalf of the corporate
trustee and the advisor individually. Further objection may be
raised by them together; that the placement of all discretionary
15 2 Scott, Trusts 1 184 (2d ed. 1956).
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duties with them jointly produces duplication of effort, and that be-
fore either can move he must await the other. A deadlock takes
them both to court.
The harness of co-trusteeship, although desirable in many rn-
stances, may prove too cumbersome for the team whose work we
are discussing here.
A second device, the discretionary clause, may do little more
than duplicate the effects of the prudent man rule established by
the decisions16 and re-affirmed by statutes like Colorado's. "The
courts are likely to interpret such provisions rather strictly," cau-
tions Scott.17 Even if the instrument contains an express direction
to retain certain stocks, the trustee may be held liable for impru-
dent compliance with the directions.' 8 A clause may provide that
the trustee can recruit investment counsel, and pay for it, but it
does not relieve him of the ultimate decision and the liability which
follows.
The third mechanism, the exculpatory clause, is of questionable
value in dealing with the problem under study here. It is proper to
relieve a trustee of the consequences of ordinary negligence; but if
such a clause goes too far in exempting the trustee from any lia-
bility whatever for the consequences of his mistakes, it may have
defeated the very purpose of having a trust at all. A trust is de-
signed to lodge somewhere the responsibility of managing the
estate. Responsibility without some liability is an anamoly. Public
policy cannot support carte blanche waivers of trustees' liabilities.19
On the other hand, too faint an exculpation may afford the trustee
no reassurance that he is protected, and he finds himself at the door
wherein we entered at the beginning of this article.
Some of the cures mentioned up to this point may be compared
with the old mustard-plaster treatment of the common cold: the
cure was worse than the ailment. But a specific remedy remains to
be examined.
The fourth contrivance appears to be the most versatile and ef-
fective solution for special investment problems. It is suggested in
2 Scott § 185: "By the terms of the Trust it may be provided that
the action of the Trustee in certain respects shall be subject to the
control of ... a third person in no way connected with the trust."
By this means a settlor and his lawyer may recruit the talents
of an advisor without subjecting him to all the responsibilities of a
trustee. Such an advisor is a fiduciary - but only with respect to
the specific assignment given him. He need not hover over the
shoulder of the corporate trustee in other matters; yet his attention
to the special topic assigned is reassurance that the settlor may safe-
ly relinquish control.
That the trustee is well-insulated by this device is made clear
in Reeve v. Chase National Bank.20 There, a power of investment
was retained in the settlor himself. He later yielded to the corpo-
rate trustee's persuasion to buy second mortgages. When a loss en-
16 The leading case is Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick. 446 (Mass. 1830). Its language appears
in the Colorado 'prudent man" law quoted herein, p. 306.
17 3 Scott, Trusts § 227.14 at 1704.
1S Id. § 230.1 at 1721.
19 2 Scott, Trusts 1 222 (2d ed. 1956).
:20 287 N.Y. Supp. 937 (1946).
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sued, the court held that the settlor could not escape the conse-
quences of the power he had reserved and exercised. The case is
notably strong in view of the fact that the mortgages urged by the
bank-trustee were those offered by its own affiliate. Ignoring the
trustee's self-dealing, and viewing the trust instrument, the court
said, "The directions of the settlor were a protection to the trustee."
Reinforcing this position is Hartman's Estate,"2 1 which acknowl-
edged that the settlor might lodge all management powers in a
holder designated for that purpose. The trustee was absolved of any
consequences of the holder's misbehavior not known to him nor
reasonably discoverable by him. From this rule it must follow that
the lodging of some powers in their holder effects corresponding
protection to the trustee.
One authority suggests that a limited power may be specially
restricted, as desired by the settlor, to guard against forseeable con-
tingencies. Thus the holder might be directed to hold common stock
only so long as dividends are maintained in the manner specified.22
It is often best to leave the initiative for guiding affairs of the
estate with the bank-trustee, only establishing the power-holder as
monitor in a narrow field of action. The words of the instrument
may give the holder a power to veto some actions, or compel others.
It has already been stated that the power-holder is a fiduciary
in his small arena, though he is not a trustee because he lacks title.
A clear abuse of his discretion invokes the authority of the courts;
21 331 Pa. 422, 200 AtI.49 (1938).
22 Knecht, Trust Advisor, 94 Trusts and Estates 815 (1955).
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but to have such an effect, the abuse must be clear. This was illus-
trated in a case involving a trust established by John D. Rockefeller
for his daughter and generations to follow. The instrument gave a
committee power to allocate receipts to income or principal of the
trust estate. When the committee assigned all stock dividends to
principal (contrary to the practice approved by New York statute
at the time) the court held that this was not an improper exercise
of the discretion Mr. Rockefeller intended. 23 (The reports of this
case do not disclose the amount involved, but a clue is provided by
the number of attorneys who participated. Nineteen lawyers ap-
peared for the parties below, and sixteen appeared at the court of
appeals to hear the judgment affirmed. None of the ten judges who
dealt with the case ventured to second-guess the financial acumen
of John D. Rockefeller.)
Consistent with the Rockefeller decision, cases reported by
Scott require extreme conduct on the part of a holder to charge him
with abuse of discretion.2 4 Abuse is equated with "dishonesty," "im-
proper motive," or "action beyond the bounds of reasonable judg-
ment."
Settlors should be comforted by the law's insistence that trus-
tees must comply with the directions given by a holder pursuant to
the instrument. The trustee who refuses compliance, or fails to se-
cure the holder's consent when required, has breached his trust.
25
What, then, if the trustee complies and losses follow? Any loss
resulting from good faith compliance with the directions of the hold-
er will not be surcharged to the trustee.26 Further, should it be dis-
covered that a trustee has inadvertently acted without the holder's
approval, the defect may be cured by later ratification from the
holder.
Thus the trustee's liability for investment losses occasioned by
the holder's misguidance can spring only from the trustee's failure
to take corrective action in two situations: (1) If he knows, or
ought to know, that the holder is violating his fiduciary duties; (2)
If changes unanticipated by the settlor, but discovered by the trus-
tee, make compliance with the terms likely to impair the trust.
23 Chase Nat'l. Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. 271 N.Y. 602, 3 N.E. 2d 205 (1936).
24 2 Scott, Trusts 9 185 (2d ed. 1956).
25 Ibid.
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Even these sources of liability to the trustee may be averted by
terms in the instrument relieving him of a duty to inquire, and ex-
pressly giving sole control to the holder. If the instrument does not
intend such blanket authority in the holder, the trustee's duty is
satisfied by a reasonable amount of inquiry into the propriety of the
investment.
Advisors may, of course, be appointed by the instrument to de-
cide discretionary matters other than selection of investments. In-
genious draftsmen will foresee questions of invasion of'corpus, allo-
cation of receipts to income or principal, and similar matters.
2
1
An advisor, rather than a co-trustee, may be advantageous
where the advisor lives at a distance from the trustee and could not
participate in all trustee actions without undue delays.
The power device prescribed here seems to have gained popu-
larity since 1930. The paucity of appellate decisions on the topic in-
dicates that power-holders stay out of court. They travel under sev-
eral names: "quasi-trustee,"28 "advisory trustee"2 9 and "trust ad-
visor."13
A search of Colorado Supreme Court reports disclosed no cases
hinging on the validity of the powers of a trust advisor. One may
surmise that the strategy has not been employed widely in this
jurisdiction- or that lawyers who employed it have succeeded in
keeping their clients out of litigation. Trust advisors' powers, care-
fully drafted and prudently employed, may gather favor as valu-
able tools for the task of preserving assets peculiarly fitted to the
needs of trust estates.
27 Comment by Austin W. Scott, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 695 (1959).
28 120 A.L.R. 1407 (1939).
29 Gathright's Trustee v. Gant, 276 Ky. 562, 124 S.W. 2d 782 (1939).
30 Kneht, Trust Advisor, 94 Trusts and Estates 815 (1955).
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